McCullen v. Coakley: Crossing the Line on Free Speech

I was looking through some old papers I wrote in law school (study break while I prepare for the bar exam) and figured since I hadn’t posted in ages, I might as well share them with y’all!

This one was for my Constitutional Law Seminar, and was written when McCullen v Coakley was still pending at the Supreme Court! I’m happy to say that SCOTUS unanimously agreed with me, and even used many of the same quotes and cases in their opinion! Enjoy!

McCullen v. Coakley: Crossing the Line on Free Speech

In the late 1980s some pro-life groups, such as Operation Rescue, attempted to prevent abortions by several controversial methods, including instigating clinic blockades- amassing large groups of protestors that would block entrances to the clinics in order to prevent women who were seeking abortions from accessing the clinic. In some extreme and isolated cases, groups or rogue individuals would resort to violence as a means of preventing clinics and doctors from providing abortion services. In reaction, the federal government implemented laws that prohibited pro-life protestors from blocking access to clinics, or from using force or harassment against employees or patients. Some states and local governments also instituted laws, called buffer zone laws, which prohibited pro-life protestors from being within a specified distance of clinic entrances.

The Supreme Court initially upheld several buffer zones during the 1990s, but given that federal restrictions already prohibit clinic violence and blockades, along with evidence showing that these disruptive activities have all but disappeared- free speech advocates question whether the state still has a rational basis for restricting the speech of peaceful pro-life protestors, especially sidewalk counselors.

In early 2014, the Supreme Court heard arguments regarding a Massachusetts’ law which makes it a crime for speakers that are not clinic “employees or agents . . . acting within the scope of their employment” to “enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within thirty-five feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of an abortion clinic.[i] The plaintiffs in McCullen v. Coakley are asking the Supreme Court to overrule the First Circuit in regards to Buffer Zone laws, on the basis that the law in question unconstitutionally restricts the protestor’s freedom of speech.

This paper examines the constitutionality of the Massachusetts buffer zone law. Part I of this paper looks at the history behind buffer zone laws. Part II focuses on the Supreme Court’s treatment the regulation of free speech in general, and Part III looks at how the Court has specifically handled previous cases regarding buffer zones. The paper concludes by arguing that the Court should uphold the free speech rights of pro-life protestors by declaring the Massachusetts law unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of free speech found in the First Amendment.

I. The History Behind Buffer Zone Laws

“We hope to put these places out of business, expose abortionists to their community, embarrass them for what they do, expose staff workers at these places and eventually shut down the whole grisly abortion industry …”- Eric Johns, protestor with Operation Rescue.[ii] 

  1. Early History

Shortly after Roe v. Wade legalized abortion in 1973, pro-life groups such as Operation Rescue utilized civil disobedience in their quest to end abortion in America.[iii] Included among their tactics were blocking abortion clinic entrances by having their activists lie down in front of them, chaining themselves to their fellow activists and to the property, and crowding patients in order to block the clinic entrances.[iv] According to data compiled by the National Abortion Federation, there were over 30,000 arrests made during these types of blockades from 1973-1994.[v]

During this time period, the streets and sidewalks outside of some of Massachusetts’ abortion clinics were the focus of similar civil disobedience protests by pro-life groups, who resorted to disruptive tactics.[vi] In 1994, a shooting at a Massachusetts clinic killed two employees and injured several others.[vii]

    2. Legislation

As a response to the disruptive behavior of some pro-life groups, in 1994 the Federal Government passed the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act, making it a federal crime to injure, intimidate, or interfere with, someone who is seeking to obtain or provide an abortion.[viii]

In addition to the federal response, the Massachusetts legislature felt that “existing laws did not adequately safeguard clinic staff, potential patients, or members of the public,” so they addressed the situation in 2000 by passing the Massachusetts Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act (“2000 Act”).[ix]

The 2000 Act was modeled after a Colorado statute that had recently been upheld by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Colorado[x] and provided for a “floating” buffer zone that restricted pro-life activists from approaching within six feet of anyone entering or leaving an abortion clinic without that person’s consent, when within an eighteen foot radius of an abortion clinic entrance.[xi]

In 2007, the Massachusetts Legislature amended the 2000 Act to provide for a fixed thirty-five foot zone where it is unlawful to “knowingly enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk…within a radius of 35 feet from any portion of an entrance, exit, or driveway of a[n abortion clinic]”.[xii] Like the previous Act, the 2007 Act applies only during business hours, and exempts clinic employees “acting within the scope of their employment.”[xiii] The Legislature based the rationale for the revision based upon their belief that the 2000 Act was “ineffective” and did not provide adequate protection and access to abortion clinics.[xiv]

   3. Recent History

The recent history of the pro-life movement has been much more peaceful than it was during the days of Operation Rescue. The movement in general has rejected violence as a legitimate tactic and has focused their attention on more peaceful measures.[xv] As evidence of this change in tactics, is the fact that in the more than a decade of time that has passed since the 2000 Act was adopted, there have been fewer than ten arrests for clinic blockades in the United States and Canada combined.[xvi]

The focus for many pro-life advocates is the type of peaceful protesting represented by the 40 Days for Life organization, which utilizes prayer vigils as means of protest. 40 Days for Life is committed to non-violence, and before being allowed to sign up to participate in one of their prayer vigils, it is required that individuals agree to follow the rules in 40 Days for Life’s “Statement of Peace” which states the following:

  1. I will pursue only peaceful solutions to the violence of abortion when volunteering with the 40 Days for Life campaign.
  2. I will show compassion and reflect Christ’s love to all abortion facility employees, volunteers, and customers.
  3. I understand that acting in a violent or harmful manner immediately and completely disassociates me from the 40 Days for Life campaign.
  4. I am in no way associated with the abortion facility or its affiliates by way of employment, informant, volunteer, client, or otherwise.

While in front of [the] (abortion facility):

  1. I will be careful to yield to cars and pedestrians entering the parking lots.
  2. I will not obstruct the driveways, sidewalks, or doorways.
  3. I will not physically touch anyone, even in a friendly manner.
  4. I will not trespass on the private property of [the abortion clinic], which includes the parking lots, or throw anything into the abortion facility’s garbage cans.
  5. I will not litter on the public right of way
  6. I will closely attend to any children I bring to the prayer vigil
  7. I will not vandalize private or public property.
  8. I will cooperate with local city authorities.[xvii]


Other pro-life groups have pivoted their focus to education, such as Students for Life of America, whose annual conference is billed as “largest pro-life youth event in the world,”[xviii] or Live Action, which uses “powerful and dynamic media platforms to educate the public about the humanity of the unborn and investigative journalism to expose the threats against the vulnerable and defenseless.”[xix] Another tactic is “relocate[ing] the main abortion politics battlefield from the visible, participatory, and volatile streets to the more private, elite, and staid state legislative halls where they have enjoyed significant success.”[xx] In the legislative battle, non-profit legal groups like Alliance Defending Freedom, and Americans United for Life are leading the way with model legislation, as well as by defending states when regulations are challenged.[xxi]

Still others have moved their battle for the unborn to Crisis Pregnancy Centers, where “they offer information, ultrasounds, material support, and parent training with the aim of dissuading women from obtaining an abortion.”[xxii]  Even Operation Rescue has changed their tactics, now dedicating themselves to “using peaceful, legal means to uncover abortion clinic wrong-doing, expose it to the public, and bring the offending abortionist to justice.”[xxiii]

While there may remain a fringe element that accepts and justifies the use of force to bring about the end of abortion, the evidence shows that abortion related violence has all but ceased to be a problem, and that the movement has shifted to more peaceful means of communicating its message and achieving its goals.

II. The Supreme Court’s Standards on Free Speech

While the Supreme Court recognizes that there are clear exceptions to freedom of speech, and that “a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience,” the Court maintains that “these [regulations] may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion.”[xxiv]

In furthering these principles of freedom of speech, the Court has ruled multiple times that “the mere dissemination of ideas – no matter how offensive to good taste…may not be shut off in the name alone of “conventions of decency.”[xxv] Nor does “a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis” enough to justify the regulation of certain speech.[xxvi] After all, the Court argues, a “function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.”[xxvii]

The Court has also ruled that unwanted or annoying speech is not to be prohibited, saying:

The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be “annoying” to some people…[a]nd such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is “annoying” because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.[xxviii]

The Court has also recognized that certain places, are “public forums” and that the government’s ability to restrict speech there is “very limited.”[xxix] One example of this is public sidewalks, which the Court says are “quintessential” public forums, and “have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions.”[xxx] The Court added, that public access to sidewalks “is not a matter of grace by government officials but rather is inherent in the open nature of the location.”[xxxi]

The Court laid out a test by which to measure governmental regulations of free speech in public forums in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, ruling:

[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.[xxxii]

It is based upon these principles and precedents that the Court first took up the issue of buffer zones, and made their initial rulings, and it is under these rules that they will eventually consider the facts in McCullen as well.

III. The Supreme Court’s Handling of Buffer Zone Laws

“[Petitioners] correctly state that their leafleting, sign displays, and oral communications are protected by the First Amendment. The fact that the messages conveyed by those communications may be offensive to their recipient does not deprive them of constitutional protection.”[xxxiii]

  1. Masden v. Women’s Health Center

At the height of pro-life civil disobedience in 1994, the Court heard Masden v. Women’s Health Center, which dealt with buffer zone regulations implemented by court-ordered injunctions.[xxxiv] Originally ordered in 1992 in response to ongoing clinic blockades, the injunction in Masden, among other things, implemented a thirty-six foot buffer zone around an abortion clinic in Florida.[xxxv] The Court upheld this provision in large part because the record showed that the protestors at this location “repeatedly had interfered with the free access of the patients and staff”.[xxxvi] Indeed, the protestors at this location went so far as to violate the district court’s original order that only prohibited blockading the entrances.[xxxvii] Additionally, this buffer zone was specifically drawn by a court order, not a general provision of law, and only targeted the specific location where the protestors had caused major problems, which the Court took into account in deciding that the buffer zone in this case was narrowly drawn to prohibit the unlawful actions.[xxxviii]

   2. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network

At the same time the Court was hearing Masden, a similar case regarding injunctions against pro-life protestors was making its way up to the Supreme Court—Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network. In 1990, a federal court in New York issued an injunction prohibiting any picketing or demonstrations around an abortion clinic within a fixed buffer zone of fifteen feet; additionally, the district court imposed a floating buffer zone of fifteen feet from anyone entering or leaving the clinic unless the conversation was consensual in nature.[xxxix]

In keeping with their previous ruling in Masden, the Court explained that the proper test for evaluating whether an injunction was content-neutral under the First Amendment, “[is] whether the challenged provisions… burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”[xl] While the Court acknowledged that “leafleting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of free speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendments, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks,” having been presented with a record of behavior by protestors similar to that in Masden, they ruled that “in some situations, a record of abusive conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public sidewalk permissible,” and upheld the fixed fifteen foot buffer zone.[xli] While the Court upheld the fixed buffer zone, they also made it clear that the objective was to secure the sidewalks for access, noting:

We doubt that the District Court’s reason for including that provision-“to protect the right of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone”-accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence in this area. Madsen sustained an injunction designed to secure physical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right “to be left alone” on a public street or sidewalk. As we said in Madsen, quoting from Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 322, “as a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”[xlii]

The Court in Schenck did strike down the fifteen foot floating buffer zone, reasoning that the zone “burden[ed] more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. The floating buffer zones prevent defendants…from communicating a message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks.”[xliii]

3. Hill v. Colorado

In 2000, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a 1993 Colorado statute that regulated speech-related conduct within 100 feet of all healthcare facilities. The statute called for an eight foot “floating buffer zone”, meaning that while within 100 feet of any health care facility, pro-life protestors could not approach within eight feet of anyone without their permission.[xliv] The Court chose to uphold the statute, saying that it was a “content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.”[xlv]

The Court ruled that the statute in Hill was content-neutral because it affected all health care facilities, not just ones that provided abortions, saying, “the comprehensiveness of the statute [was] a virtue, not a vice, because it [was] evidence against there being a discriminatory governmental motive,” and that “there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government, than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”[xlvi]

In finding that the regulation was “narrowly tailored,” the Court in Hill strongly emphasized that the only restriction in the Colorado statute was on unwanted, close physical approaches by protestors, while other speech was allowed within the regulated area.[xlvii] The Court recognized that “the First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing listeners, and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.”[xlviii] The Court believed that the provision in Hill gave pro-life protestors this opportunity by protecting all other types of communication save actually approaching someone, with the Court “reiterating that only attempts to address unwilling listeners are affected.”[xlix] Under Hill, a plethora of other alternate speech activities were available to the protestors- silent prayer, talking in a loud voice, the wearing of pro-life shirts and symbols, and the stationary holding of signs and passing out of informational leaflets.

In his dissent, Justice Scalia, in his usably acerbic style, savages the majority opinion by saying, “[h]aving deprived abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues  and expands its assault upon their individual right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”[l] He goes on to argue that the regulation here, while not specifically aimed at a certain subject of communication, is still not content neutral, since it targets a specific type of communication- protests.[li]

Scalia also noted that the Court uses as its justification, “the State’s interest in protecting its citizens’ rights to be let alone from unwanted speech,” which Colorado not only never asserted, but actually explicitly rejected in its brief.[lii] Finally, he points to the language in Schenck, where the Court stated that there was no general right to be left alone.[liii]

III. How McCullen v. Coakley Crosses the Line

“Eleanor McCullen…is a 76-year-old grandmother who aims to stand on public sidewalks near abortion clinics in order to reach this unique audience at a unique moment, in a compassionate and non-confrontational way. Over the years, hundreds of women have accepted such offers of help from McCullen and other petitioners.”[liv]

  1. Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner?

In deciding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute at issue in McCullen v Coakley, the Court should look to its prior precedent regarding the regulation of speech in public forums, because the statute deals with speech on public sidewalks, which as previously mentioned, the Court has noted many times, are “quintessential” public forums, and “have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions.”[lv]

As such, the Court should apply the test from Ward v. Rock Against Racism, which requires that regulations must be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and provide ample alternative means of communication. Taking these three elements and applying them to the statute in McCullen should show clearly whether or not the statue is a permissible regulation of free speech. It should be noted that the Court places the burden of proving that the regulations are not overly burdensome on the government, not those seeking to overturn the regulations.[lvi]

2. Content Neutral

In Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, the Court struck down regulations limiting the ability to picket at schools, saying the government may not create rules favoring speech on “one preferred subject,” conversely the government also may not create rules that effectively disfavor speech on one topic.[lvii] In regards to the 2007 Act, however, both State and lower federal courts have acknowledged that the law is focused deliberately on abortion related speech, [lviii] and Petitioners argue vehemently in their brief and in oral arguments that the 2007 Act is not content neutral because it only applies to abortion clinics, and because it exempts speech by abortion clinic employees and agents.

On the first contention, the Court has previously agreed that “apart from text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object,”[lix] and the record contains no evidence of any non-abortion related speech being affected by the law.[lx] The 2007 Act undeniably applies only to abortion clinics, and only during business hours, which at the very least is suggestive regarding the type of speech it is designed to affect. Many who sympathize with abortion rights have also criticized the Court’s reasoning in Hill, with some of them calling it “slam-dunk simple and slam-dunk wrong,” [lxi] and that it “showed a striking readiness to accept [efforts] to draw a facially neutral statute to achieve goals clearly targeting particular content.”[lxii]

Additionally, in his concurrence in Hill, Justice Souter reasoned “[t]he fact that speech by a stationary speaker [was] untouched by th[e] statute show[ed] that the reason…[went] to the approaches, not the content of the speech of those approaching.”[lxiii] There is no such evidence here, as the speech of all pro-life protestors within thirty five feet of an abortion clinic is restricted, regardless of whether it is consensual or not.

The 2007 Act also exempts some speakers, namely employees and agents of the abortion clinics. These people may walk freely about the thirty five foot buffer zone, interacting with patients in a way that arguably expresses the views of the clinic. The Court has previously stated exemptions from speech regulations “may represent a governmental attempt to give one side of debatable public question an advantage,”[lxiv] and that “granting waivers to favored speakers would of course be unconstitutional.”[lxv] Therefore the government may not “grant the use of a forum to people whose view its finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”[lxvi] By allowing clinic workers and agents (such as volunteer “escorts”) to speak to women within the buffer zone while banning pro-life activists (such as “sidewalk counselors”) seeking to speak to these same women, the 2007 Act does just that. In oral arguments, Justice Alito gave the following example showing the problem:

A woman is approaching the door of a clinic, and she enters the zone. Two other women approach her. One is an employee of the facility, the other is not. The first who is an employee of the facility says, good morning. This is a safe facility. The other one who’s not an employee says, good morning, this is not a safe facility. Now, under this statute, the first one has not committed a crime; the second one has committed a crime. And the only difference between the two is that they’ve expressed a different viewpoint. One says it’s safe; one says it’s not safe. Now, how can a statute like that be considered viewpoint-neutral?[lxvii]

Respondents argue that the statute in that instance is not concerned with the speech of the clinic agent, but only exempts their actions (i.e. escorting the woman to the clinic doors).[lxviii] This however, should be considered unpersuasive as the Court has repeatedly held that a plethora of actions are forms of symbolic speech.[lxix] In Texas v Johnson, the Court said that conduct could be viewed as speech when “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”[lxx] Many of the clinic escorts are volunteers, who participate for the express purpose of express purpose of symbolically expressing their permissive viewpoint on abortion, and this intent is well-known; therefore, it would be accurate to depict even the act of escorting women into the clinic as symbolic speech.[lxxi] By allowing this pro-choice, pro-clinic speech, but denying pro-life speech, the statute shows that it is not content neutral. As Justice Berzon of the 9th Circuit explained in a similar case, “distinguishing between speech that facilitates access to clinics and speech that discourages access is not content-neutral. It is the epitome of a content-based speech restriction.”[lxxii]

Because the law specifically targets speech at abortion clinics (which is logically going to be restricted to abortion related speech), and because it exempts the pro-clinic symbolic speech expressed by clinic employees and agents, the 2007 Act is not content neutral.

  3. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Governmental Interest

Massachusetts cites as its governmental interest in implementing these regulations, a concern for public safety and the need to secure access to legal health services, pointing to what they call a “history of violence” outside abortion clinics.[lxxiii] Indeed, the Court has long recognized that the government has the power to regulate certain speech-related activities on public sidewalks, such as violence, obstruction and intimidation.[lxxiv] However, the Court has previously invalidated speech regulations where “there are appropriate public remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if [the speech at issue] should result in disorder and violence.”[lxxv]

The record before the Court shows that under the 2000 Act, there were only a handful of arrests and even fewer prosecutions for violations outside of abortion clinics; in fact, during oral arguments, it was asserted by petitioners (without contradiction) that the last conviction of an pro-life protestor in the state was in 1997, and the federal government had never prosecuted a FACE violation in the state.[lxxvi] The national statistics echo this assertion, as between 2000-2006 evidence shows that there were only three arrests for blockading clinics, and fewer than one hundred incidents of physical violence in the entire US and Canada.[lxxvii]

Absent evidence of actual violence justifying the stricter regulations, Massachusetts points to the opinion of some law enforcement officials that the 2000 Act was difficult to enforce, and did not allow them to keep the entrances to the clinic clear.[lxxviii] This argument does not seem persuasive for two reasons- first, there were already numerous state and federal laws that could be used to either prosecute or bring civil suit against individuals if they were truly blocking access to the clinics,[lxxix] and the Court expects states to use the laws on the books to their full extent before increasing regulations[lxxx]; and secondly, the Court has previously ruled “the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency,” therefore the opinion that a fixed zone would be easier to enforce is not a “significant” justification.[lxxxi]

Additionally, the fact that some women might be discouraged from entering an abortion clinic by the presence of protestors is not a governmental interest at all. Abortion clinics are businesses, and businesses have historically been the target of protests and demonstrations based on the services they provide. The Court has previously stated that protestors discouraging business is not a valid justification for the government’s interference:

It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another group in society. But the group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.[lxxxii]

Even if there was ample support for there being a “significant” governmental interest, the 2007 Act’s regulations are not narrowly drawn to serve the interests asserted by Massachusetts. For instance, the same interests have been cited in other cases where the regulations were much narrower- Masden and Schenck applied only to certain clinics where the record showed extraordinary circumstances necessitated them, and Hill regulated only unwanted physical approaches. The 2007 Act, however, categorically restricts all speech regardless of whether or not such speech raises any prospect of violence or obstruction. Similar to a law the Court struck down banning speech at airports, the Massachusetts regulations do not “merely regulate expressive activity … that might create problems such as congestion or … disruption” but outlaws all communications on the public sidewalks affected, even “talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing.”[lxxxiii] Outlawing all these forms of communication plainly “burden[s] substantially more speech than in necessary.”[lxxxiv] As Alan Brownstein, a law professor at UC Davis School of Law, put it:

If the state’s goal was to prevent people from blocking access to the clinics, why couldn’t it draft a narrower, more precise law prohibiting obstruction? One or two peaceful “counselors” would not block access to a clinic. Yet the challenged law substantially burdened their ability to communicate their message. Perhaps loud protestors with signs could communicate their message 35 feet away from the targeted audience, but soft spoken counselors needed to be closer to the women they were addressing.[lxxxv]

Additionally most of the evidence regarding congestion that the state uses to justify the regulations occur only at one clinic (in Boston), at one specific time (Saturday mornings).[lxxxvi] If this is a limited problem, the Court has previously advised states that an individualized approach is preferable to a broad statutory response:

Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter. Freedom of expression, and its intersection with the guarantee of equal protection, would rest on a soft foundation indeed if government could distinguish among picketers on such a wholesale and categorical basis.[lxxxvii]

Professor Brownstein, however, argues that this contention is doubtful, noting “[t] he Court has never prohibited government from legislating categorically or insisted that every time, place, and manner regulation has to be evaluated park by park, neighborhood by neighborhood, or street by street.”[lxxxviii]

The approach in the original 2000 Act was based off Hill, which was previously acknowledged by the Court as striking the appropriate balance between safety and free speech by limiting only unwanted close physical approaches. In Hill the Court states that “the First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing listeners, and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention,” and reasoned that allowing protestors to attempt to engage listeners within the area of facilities protected their right and ability to speak.[lxxxix] The 2000 Act was a much narrower regulation that preserved this right held by all citizens, and is much less burdensome upon free speech.

The record in this case simply does not support Massachusetts’ assertion that the regulations in the 2007 Act serve a significant governmental interest that could not be served by the 2000 Act, limited injunctive relief at affected clinics where there is a proven problem, or some combination of other more modest regulations than the 2007 Act provides for.

       4. Ample Alternative Means of Communication

Throughout our nation’s judicial history the right to engage in free speech activities, such as asking others to willingly stop and converse, has been jealously guarded by the Court.[xc] By enacting a complete prohibition on any speech within thirty five feet of abortion clinics, the 2007 Act effectively deprives women of the “right and privilege to determine for [themselves] what speech and speakers are worthy of their attention,’[xci] and deprives pro-life protestors of their rights without allowing them ample alternative means of communication.

Unlike the regulations in Hill, which prohibited only one type of communication and left all other methods untouched, the 2007 Act indiscriminately bans all communication within the thirty five foot zone. Respondents argue that the pro-life protestors have ample alternative methods of communication… outside the buffer zone.[xcii] The Court has already excluded this as an argument, stating that “[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”[xciii] Under the 2007 Act, any and all methods of communication by pro-life protestors is forbidden, including entering the zone while merely wearing a pro-life shirt or symbol, engaging in non-obstructive peaceful prayer within the zone, or entering into a conversation regarding abortion with a willing participant. The fact that the protestors can engage in these methods of communication in another place is not evidence of ample means of alternate communication.

Additionally, the Court has previously recognized that “one-on-one communication is the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse,’ and that “the First Amendment protects [citizens’] right not only to advocate their cause, but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.” [xciv]

To this end, Petitioners’ desire to exercise their right to free speech by speaking one-on-one to the women who are potentially seeking abortions, in a compassionate and non-confrontational manner, in order to provide them with information on resources that may ease their worries about continuing their pregnancy to its natural conclusion.[xcv] They very logically argue that the effectiveness of their advocacy relies largely on their ability to speak in a normal conversational tone to women as they walk along the public sidewalks adjacent to an abortion clinic, and that the thirty five-foot buffer zones enacted by the 2007 Act not only do not allow them to engage consensual conversations within the zone, but also hinder their attempts to engage women already within the zones in conversations.[xcvi] The alternative they are left with is standing thirty five feet away, yelling at women entering the clinic, which is arguably extremely damaging to their message of compassion and non-confrontation.

The speech regulations contained in the 2007 Act amount to a total prohibition of speech, and the definition of a prohibition allows for no actual alternative method of communication, save going outside the zone being regulated. Even when they go outside the zone, the message of pro-life protestors is considerably less effective in nature, and is therefore diminished by the so-called alternative methods of communications Massachusetts would allow them.

III. Conclusion

While in the past the Supreme Court has upheld some forms of buffer zones, the jurisprudential precedent shows that they have taken a very limited approach that seeks to proactively protect the rights of pro-life protestors, and these previous Supreme Court decisions are straightforwardly distinguishable from the facts in McCullen v. Coakley.

The Supreme Court’s guidelines regarding when public speech is allowed to be regulated is not upheld by the facts in McCullen. The 2007 Act’s targeting of speech only outside of abortions clinics, combined with the exemptions that allow symbolic speech favoring abortion clinics demonstrate that the regulations are not content neutral. The historical evidence does not show that there is a significant governmental interest requiring the level of regulations contained in the 2007 Act, nor that the prior laws were insufficient to handle any issues Massachusetts abortion clinics were facing under the 2000 Act. Finally, the complete prohibition included in the 2007 Act emphatically precludes any alternative methods of communication, save going somewhere else. Because of the failure of the Massachusetts law to meet the standards set by prior Court precedent, the Court should overrule the First Circuit, and uphold the free speech rights of the pro-life protestors.



[i] McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. Mass. 2013), cert. granted, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4811 (U.S. 2013).

[ii] Clinics Prepare for Operation Rescue – Again, Associated Press, July 05, 1993 available at:

[iii] Operation Rescue, History, (2014),

[iv] Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664 (1989).

[v] Nat’l Abortion Fed’n , Incidents of Violence and Disruption against Abortion Providers in US & Canada, (2012),

[vi] Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d 664, at 664-65.

[vii] McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F3d 36,39 (1st Circ. 2001).

[viii] Title 18, U.S.C., §248.

[ix] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[x] Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000).

[xi] Mass. Stat. 200, Ch. 217.

[xii] Mass. Gen. Laws Ch.266, § 120E½ (2012).

[xiii] Id. §120E½(b)(1)-(4).

[xiv] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10-12, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[xv] See generally: Violence: Why It Won’t Work, in Joseph M. Scheidler, Closed (Tan Books & Pub 1993).

[xvi] Nat’l Abortion Fed’n , Incidents of Violence and Disruption against Abortion Providers in US & Canada, (2012),

[xvii] 40 Days for Life, Statement of Peace, available at:

[xviii] Students for Life of America, About Us, available at:

[xix] Live Action, About Live Action, available at:

[xx] Joshua C. Wilson, The Anti-abortion Movement Has Changed. Here’s What that Means for Abortion Clinics., Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2014 available at:

[xxi] Id.

[xxii] Id.

[xxiii] Operation Rescue, History, available at:

[xxiv]Schneider v. State 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).

[xxv] Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973).

[xxvi] Texas v. Johnson, 491 US, 397, 409 (1989).

[xxvii] Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

[xxviii] Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1972)

[xxix] US v. Grace, 461 US 171, 177 (1983).

[xxx] US v. Kokinda, 497 US 720, 743 (1990) (quoting Hague v. Committee for Industry Organizations, 307 US 496, 515 (1939), opinion of Roberts, J.)

[xxxi] Id.

[xxxii] Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791(1989).

[xxxiii] Hill v. Colorado, 530 US 703, 715 (2000).

[xxxiv] Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1994)

[xxxv] Id.

[xxxvi] Id., at 769.

[xxxvii] Id., at770.

[xxxviii] Id.

[xxxix] Schneck v. Prochoice Network, 519 US 357 (1997).

[xl] Id., at 374.

[xli] Id., at 377. The record further showed that “protesters purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out of clinic parking lots…followed and crowded people right up to the doorways of the clinics (and sometimes beyond) and then tended to stay in the doorways, shouting at the individuals who had managed to get inside,” and even harassed the police. Id., at 379.

[xlii] Id., at 383.

[xliii] Id., at 377

[xliv] Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-9-122(3) (1999).

[xlv] Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000).

[xlvi] Id., at 731.

[xlvii] Id., at 726-7.

[xlviii] Id., at 723.

[xlix] Id., at 727.

[l] Id., at 741-42.

[li] Id., at 746-48.

[lii] Id., at 750.

[liii] Id., at 751.

[liv] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[lv] US v. Kokinda, 497 US 720, 743 (1990).

[lvi] See Board of Trustees of New York State University v. Fox, 492 US 469, 480 (1989); US v. Playboy, 529 US 803, 816 (2000).

[lvii] Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-2 (U.S. 1972).

[lviii] Pet. App. 166a, 113a, 117a.

[lix] Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 535 (1993)

[lx] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 24,  McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[lxi] Lawrence Tribe, quoted in ColloquiumProfessor Michael W. McConnell’ Response, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 747, 750 (2001).

[lxii] Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 723, 737 (2001)

[lxiii] Hill at 738.

[lxiv] City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 US 43, 51 (1994).

[lxv]Thomas v Chicago Bank District, 534 US 316, 325 (2002).

[lxvi] Mosely, 408 US at 96.

[lxvii] MCCULLEN v. COAKLEY, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, (last visited March 22, 2014)

[lxviii] Id.

[lxix] See generally: United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1968) (burning of draft card); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1969) (wearing of armbands); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1984) (sleeping overnight in a public park); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (U.S. 1991) (nude dancing).

[lxx] Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).

[lxxi] Ilissa Gold, My First Morning (Of Many) As a Clinic Escort, Daily Kos, Feb. 18, 2011, available at: (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).

[lxxii] Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2011).

[lxxiii] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[lxxiv] See Ward, 491 U.S. 781, (1989).

[lxxv] Kunz v. People of NY, 340 US 290, 294 (1951).

[lxxvi] MCCULLEN v. COAKLEY, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, (last visited March 12, 2014).

[lxxvii] Nat’l Abortion Fed’n , Incidents of Violence and Disruption against Abortion Providers in US & Canada, , (2012),

[lxxviii] Brief of Respondent, at 10, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[lxxix] See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 266, § 120E1/2(e) (obstructing, detaining, hindering, impeding, or blocking a person’s entry to abortion clinic); id. § 120E (obstructing entry to medical facilities); 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (using force, threat of force, or physical obstruction to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person obtaining or providing reproductive health services); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 265, § 13A (assault and battery; enhanced sentence if perpetrator knows victim is pregnant); Id. ch. 272, § 53(b) (disturbing the peace). State and federal laws also specifically prohibit impersonating a police officer–a form of misconduct advanced as a justification for the 2007 Act. See Id. Ch. 268, § 3; 18 U.S.C. § 912; JA 124, See 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1) (permitting any person seeking to provide or obtain reproductive health services to seek injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and compensatory and punitive damages); id. § 248(c)(2)-(3) (permitting federal and state attorneys general to seek injunctive relief, civil penalties, and compensatory damages on behalf of aggrieved persons); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 266, § 120E (permitting medical facilities to obtain injunctive relief and compensatory and exemplary damages against persons obstructing entry); Id. Ch. 12, § 11H (permitting state attorney general to obtain injunctive relief against private persons who intimidate, interfere with, or coerce a person seeking to exercise rights protected by federal or state law).

[lxxx] Riley v. National Federation of Blind, 487 US 781, 795 (1988) (“North Carolina has an antifraud law, and we presume that law enforcement officers are ready and able to use it”).

[lxxxi] Id.

[lxxxii] Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).

[lxxxiii] Board of Airport Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1987).

[lxxxiv] Ward, 491 US at 799.

[lxxxv] Alan Brownstein, Recapping McCullen V. Coakley Oral Argument, ACS Blog, Jan. 22, 14 at available   at

[lxxxvi] Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at 13, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[lxxxvii] Police Dept of Chicago v. Mosely, 409 U.S. 92, 100-101(1972).

[lxxxviii] Brownstein, Supra.

[lxxxix] Id. at 723.

[xc] Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 309 (1940).

[xci] Citizens United v. FEC, 558 US 310, 340-41 (2010).

[xcii] Brief of Respondent, at 49-50, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[xciii] Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.

[xciv] Meyer v. Grant, 486 US 414, 424 (1988).

[xcv] See generally, Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168 (U.S.  May 25, 2013).

[xcvi] Id.




Today was an amazing day! I am so proud to have been a part of this amazing moment in Louisiana history!

The House of Representatives voted to send HB 388 to Governor Bobby Jindal for signature! The vote was a bipartisan 88-5! When Rep. Katrina Jackson called for cosponsors to come stand with her, the response was overwhelming, with almost the entire house floor empty! Tears came to my eyes as she urged for final passage of the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act!

I was honored & humbled to have been recognized on the floor for my efforts to get this bill passed by Reps Jackson & Hoffman! I was also thankful to be awarded some delicious Pro-life brownies by Rep. Burns after passage! All in all one of the best days of my life! 

I also testified on HB 305 & HB 1262 (formerly HB 727) this morning!



HB 388, HB 305, and HB 1262 are the work of the amazing Bioethics Defense Fund! It’s been an honor to work with them on these important pieces of legislation! Learn more about this great pro-life group and their groundbreaking work at their website:

Abortion and Mental Health: HB 727

StBlogostine's Pic of IRMA women-men 2011 MFLDue to some unforeseen transportation issues, I was unable to make it to the Capitol in time to testify on HB 727. But I still think its important to educate people on why this bill is neccessary, so I’m going to share the testimony I had planned, which I will save for the Senate Committee. So here goes…


Dr. Mary Calderone, the former medical director of Planned Parenthood, once admitted: “…in almost every case, abortion, whether legal or illegal, is a traumatic experience that may have severe consequences later on.”[1] And she was correct- in addition to the many other health risks associated with induced abortion, there is a documented risk of increased mental health issues such as depression, drug abuse, and suicide. My name is Deanna, I am a law student at LSU, and I’m here today on behalf of Law Students for Life of America, in support of this bill, because Louisiana women deserve to receive informed consent about the mental health risks associated with abortion.

In his book Abuse of Discretion, attorney Clarke Forsythe points to the fact that there have been more than one hundred peer-reviewed studies, published in international medical journals, suggesting an association between abortion and adverse mental health outcomes.[2] Among these studies are:

  • A 2000 study in the American Journal of Drug & Alcohol Abuse finding a “five-fold increased incidence of abuse of alcohol and drugs in those who had aborted compared to those who carried to term.
  • A 2004 study in American Journal of Drug & Alcohol Abuse that found that women who had abortions had a higher rate of subsequent substance abuse than women who had never been pregnant or women who gave birth after unexpected pregnancies.
  • A 2003 Obb-stet-trick-cal & Gynecological Survey found that “induced abortion increased…[the incidence of] mood disorders substantial enough to provoke attempts of self-harm.”
  • A study in the Medical Science Monitor found that women with a history of abortion have a significantly higher risk of experiencing clinical depression than women who carry their children to term. This study was reinforced by a 2005 study in the Journal of Anxiety Disorders.
  • A 2006 study in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry that concluded “young women who aborted were at a higher risk for various mental health problems compared to women who carried to term…” including:

o   42% reported major depression

o   39% suffered from anxiety disorders, and

o   27% reported suicidal ideation.

  • 2010 study in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry found that “abortion was associated with an increased likelihood of several mental disorders- mood disorders… substance use disorders…as well as suicidal ideation and suicide attempts.”
  • a 2011 study in the British Journal of Psychiatry, which is a publication of Britain’s Royal College of Psychiatrists, showed a moderate to high increased risk of mental health problems after abortion, specifically:

o   34% higher risk of anxiety

o    30% higher risk of depression

o   110% higher rate of alcohol use

o   220% higher marijuana use

o   155% higher risk of suicidal behavior.

In addition to the studies cited by Forscythe, I’ve provided you with a list of publications dealing with the mental health risks of abortion; this list was compiled by the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

In upholding informed consent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court stated that “In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”[3] The proposed legislation would uphold the Court’s standard on informed consent, and should be passed to protect Louisiana women.




[1] Calderone, Illegal Abortion as a Public Health Problem, at 951

[2] Forsythe, Clarke D. (2013-09-24). Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade

[3] Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)



HB 388, HB 305, and HB 1262 are the work of the amazing Bioethics Defense Fund! It’s been an honor to work with them on these important pieces of legislation! Learn more about this great pro-life group and their groundbreaking work at their website:

The Viability of Roe, Part 5: Is Abortion Good for Women?


“All factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age-relevant to the well-being of the patient…”[1]

“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases … the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.”[2]

These are the words used by Justice Blackmun in Roe and her companion case Doe v Bolton, to describe the so-called “health exception” in regards to the right to abortion. Additionally, Justice Blackmun implied that abortion was safer for the mother[3]. He also repeats this and go, saying that “advances in medicine and medical techniques have made it safer for a woman to have a medically induced abortion than for her to bear a child.”[4] But the credibility of these sources cited in regards to this claim, has been seriously called into question by many people.[5] Even today, maternal mortality and abortion mortality rates cannot be compared, due to the fact that neither federal nor state governments maintain any system of human form and mandatory reporting of abortion deaths or injuries. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention depends completely on voluntary reporting systems and estimates the maternal deaths are underreported by 30 to 150 percent.[6] also things that have nothing to do with the biological risks of pregnancy, such as accidents, and homicides are also included in maternal death figures, this means that maternal death numbers are likely inflated, while the lack of reporting requirements means that abortion death figures are likely under  reported.[7]

Even Planned Parenthood, the nation’s largest abortion provider, acknowledges that abortion has many short-term risks, including blood loss, blood clots, incomplete abortions (which occur when part of the unborn child or other products of pregnancy are not completely emptied from the uterus), infections, and injury to the cervix or other organs, including cervical lacerations and incompetent cervix – a condition that can also affect subsequent pregnancies.[8]

Additionally, at that time there had been no studies done on the long-term effects abortion can have on women, both physically and emotionally. In the more than 40 years since Roe, doctors and psychologists have documented at least six long-term risks associated with abortion[9]:

  • Increased risk of preterm birth or premature delivery and future pregnancies.
  • Increased risk of placenta previa and future pregnancies.[10]
  • Increased incidence of drug and alcohol abuse.
  • Increased risk of suicide in psychiatric admission after abortion.
  • Loss of the protective effect against breast cancer of the first full term pregnancy.
  • Increased risk of violence and assault after abortion

Preterm birth occurs when the child is born prior to the 37th week of pregnancy, and it is very dangerous to the child. In fact, according to the US Center for Disease Control premature birth is a leading cause of infant mortality in the United States.[11] Preterm birth can also be a risk factor for later disabilities, including cerebral palsy and behavior problems in the child.[12]

As of right now over 130 published studies have shown statistically significant association between induced abortion and subsequent preterm birth or low birth weight. Three different systematic studies were performed in 2009, and each one demonstrated the risk of preterm birth following induced abortions.[13] The increased risk of preterm birth in these studies fell between 20% and 37%, increasing exponentially to over 100% when the woman had multiple abortions. The Institute of Medicine, a section within the National Academy of Science, also lists first trimester abortion as a risk factor for subsequent preterm birth. [14]

Placenta previa, which is when the placenta covers all or some of the cervix, is another condition associated with previous abortions that can cause serious health risks for women. The mother can experience life-threatening hemorrhaging, and the child is placed in danger of perinatal death or medically indicated preterm birth.[15] Three separate studies showed a 50 percent increase in the risk of placenta previa after an induced abortion,[16] while another study found that the risk of placenta previa can more than double when the mother has had two or more abortions.[17]

The link between breast cancer and abortion has been hotly contested over the years, but it is scientifically indisputable, that a woman’s first full-term pregnancy can reduce her lifetime risk of breast cancer.[18] A 2003 study concluded that “clinicians are obligated to inform a pregnant woman that a decision to abort her first pregnancy. They almost doubled her lifetime risk of breast cancer through loss of the protective effect of a completed full-term pregnancy earlier in life.”[19] Additionally, at least thirty-one studies have raised the possibility that induced abortion is an “independent risk” for breast cancer, or that induced abortion can directly cause breast cancer.[20]

One of the most disturbing consequences of abortion is the mental health impact. While Justice Blackmun focused on the opinion that pregnancy and motherhood could lead to psychological distress or harm, we now have evidence that abortion increases a woman’s risk of mental health problems. As Dr. Mary Calderone, the former medical director of Planned Parenthood, once admitted: “…in almost every case, abortion, whether legal or illegal, is a traumatic experience that may have severe consequences later on.”[21]

In 2011, a groundbreaking study on the effects of abortion on mental health was published in the British Journal of psychiatry, which is a publication of Britain’s Royal College of Psychiatrists. The results of this study showed a moderate to high increased risk of mental health problems after abortion, specifically a 34% higher risk of anxiety, 30% higher risk of depression, 110% higher rate of alcohol use, 220% higher marijuana use, and 155% higher risk of suicidal behavior.[22] In fact, in his book Abuse of Discretion, Clarke Forsythe points to the fact that there have been more than one hundred peer-reviewed studies published in international medical journals, suggesting an association between abortion and adverse mental health outcomes.[23]

Recently there have been disturbing cases of men attempting to force or trick their partners into abortions, such as New York pharmacist Orbin Tercero, who was convicted in 2011 of lacing his partners drink with an abortive drug or Thomas Hill, who sexually assaulted his partner in front of their children after she refused to get an abortion for a subsequent pregnancy.[24]

While not all studies agree with these outcomes, and some come down on both sides of the issue, there’s clearly a need for further research into this issue. At the very least, these studies suggest that the Supreme Court was too hasty in supposing that abortion was good for women.



[2] Doe, 410 US at 192

[3] Roe, 410 US at 149

[4] Doe, 410 US at 190

[5] Abuse of discretion, pages 155-180

[6] Letter of Julie Louise Gerberding, M.D., M.P.H, , director, Centers for Disease Control, July 20, 2004, reprinted in brief amicus cure I have the American Center for Law and Justice in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 US 124 (2007), Gonzales v Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 2005 US briefs, 1382.

[7] Abuse of discretion, page 175.

[8] See

[9] The cost of choice (Erika bachioci); Reardon, strahan, thorpe and shuping, deaths associated with abortion compared to childbirth, 20 J.contemporary health law and policy, 279, spring 2004; Clarke Forsythe and Stephen B Presser, tragic failure of Roe V Wade: why abortion should be returned to the states, 10 Texas review of law and policy, 87, 2005; abuse of discretion, pages 155 through 180;  Thorpe, hartmann and shadigian, “long-term physical and psychological health consequences of induced abortion.

[11] Jim Thorpe et al, long-term physical and psychological health consequences of induced abortions: review of the evidence, obstrectial and gynecological survey 58(1):67, 68 (2003).

[12] W.M. Callaghan, contribution of preterm birth to infant mortality rates in the US, pediatrics 118(4): 1566 (oct 2006); B.Rooney & B.C Calhoun, induced abortion and risk of  later premature births. Physicisans & Surgeons 8(2): 46, 46-47 (2003).

[13] P. shah et al. induced termination of pregnancy and low birth weight and preterm birth: a systematic review and meta-analysis, B.J.O.G. 116(11):1425 (2009); R.H. van Oppenraaij et al, predicting adverse obstetric outcome after early pregnancy events and complications: a review, Human Reproduction. Update Advance Access 1:1 (Mar. 7, 2009); H.M. Swingle et al., Abortion and the Risk of Subsequent preterm Birth: a systematic review and meta-analysis, J. Repro. Med. 54:95 (2009).

[14] R.E. Behrman, Preterm Birth: Casues, Consequences and Prevention 519 (2006)

[15] J.M Thorpe et al., supra at 75.

[16] see  Forsythe abuse of discretion, page 255

[17] J.M. Thorpe et al., supra at 70-71

[18] Reeves, Kan, Key, et al., Breast Cancer Risk in Relation to Abortion, at 1741. See also Forscythe, Abuse of Discretion, supra pg 263-4

[19] JM Thorpe et al., supra, at 76

[20] See generally, Lanfranchi, The Abortion-Breast Cancer Link; M.C. Pike et al. Oral Contraceotive Use and Early Abortion as Risj Factors for Breast Cancer in Young Women, British Journal of Cancer 43 (1981); L.A. Brinton et al., Reproductive Factors in the Etiology of Breast Cancer, British Journal of Cancer 47 (1983)

[21] Calderone, illegal abortion as a public health problem, at 951.

[22] P. Coleman, Abortion and mental health: quantitative synthesis and analysis of research published 1995-2009, BJP 199:180-186 (2011)

[23] Page 257 ,citing  Letter to office of the United Nations High Commissioner on human rights, November 27, 2009 attachment  two, available at, e.g., Berlin at all, reasons for induced abortion, 36; Cougle, Rearden and Coleman, generalized anxiety following unintended pregnancies; Gissler et al., injury, death, suicides and homicide; Bradshaw and Slade, the effects of induced abortion or emotional experiences and relationships.

[24] Forsythe, Clarke D. (2013-09-24). Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade (p. 442). Encounter Books. Kindle Edition.

Testimony on HB 388 before the LA House Health & Welfare Committee

Deanna Candler & HB388 Sponsor Rep. Katrina Jackson before the House Health & Welfare Committee

Deanna Candler & HB388 Sponsor Rep. Katrina Jackson before the House Health & Welfare Committee

My name is Deanna Candler, I am a resident of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a law student at LSU, and am representing Law Students for Life of America. I am here today to support the proposed regulations in HB 388.

Ladies and gentleman of the committee, you will hear today that these regulations are medically unnecessary, but this simply isn’t true. The proposed regulations are common sense regulations that would protect the health of women who undergo procedures in these clinics.

These regulations are needed in Louisiana- this need is evidenced by the history of violations and complaints against Baton Rouge’s own abortion facility, the Delta Clinic. The Delta Clinic has a history of botched abortions, unsanitary conditions, multiple violations, as well as of protecting rapists, going back to 1974, and continuing to the present day. Additionally, the Delta Clinic previously employed a woman by the name of Eileen O’Neill, who after leaving the Delta Clinic, surrendered her medical license due to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Ms. O’Neill  went on to practice medicine without a license, in the Philadelphia abortion clinic of Kermit Gosnell, who was convicted of murdering innocent children who were born as a result of botched abortions, and causing the death of and  countless injuries to, the women who visited his clinic.

The women of Louisiana deserve to be protected when they walk into an abortion clinic, and this regulation would do much to assure their safety.

From a legal standpoint, this regulation will not violate the standards set up by the Supreme Court. In the landmark case, Planned Parenthood v Casey, the Supreme Court noted that “not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue,” and acknowledged that a state’s interests in protecting unborn life,  in preserving the integrity of the medical profession, preventing the coarsening of society’s moral sense, and promoting respect for human life more generally, are strong enough to warrant restrictions prior to viability, even if those regulations might make abortion more difficult or expensive to obtain.

Justice Kennedy also pointed out in the 2007 case Gonzales v. Carhart, that “Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts,’ stating that State legislatures are empowered to make their own determinations of what regulations and restrictions are medically necessary.

Under these principles, the Supreme Court has upheld many abortion restrictions and regulations, including informed consent requirements, waiting periods, parental consent for minors, reporting requirements for clinics, funding restrictions, and even a total ban on partial birth abortion.

Requiring doctors to obtain admitting privileges at local hospitals would serve to protect the health and safety of Louisiana women, and since they do not violate the principles the Supreme Court follows in determining whether an abortion regulation is an “undue burden”, I ask you to support this bill.



HB 388, HB 305, and HB 1262 are the work of the amazing Bioethics Defense Fund! It’s been an honor to work with them on these important pieces of legislation! Learn more about this great pro-life group and their groundbreaking work at their website:

The Viability of Roe, Part 4: The Misinterpretation of Legal Personhood

Another aspect important to an historical analysis of abortion is that there was widespread disapproval and prohibition of abortion during early pregnancy before, in the view of the science of the time, human life had been infused. Our ancestors’ biologically incorrect notions of when human life begins led Blackmun to assert that, historically, “abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect” (in January, 1973) and “[p]hrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does … today.”[1]

Regarding this important question, scholarly research reveals that recognition of the unborn as “persons in the whole sense” was largely determined by the biological and medical knowledge of each historical era[2]. The ovum and the actual nature of fertilization were not discovered until the nineteenth century, and prior to this, scientists and contemporaneous jurists supposed that human life commenced at “formation,” “animation,” or “quickening.” Abortion was seen as unquestionably homicidal only after the gestational point at which, in light of the science of the time, human life was finally understood to be present. [3]

Many legal scholars have pointed out that other areas of law, such as torts property and criminal law, all recognize the unborn child as a person with legal protections under the law.

[M]edical authority has recognized long sense that the child is in existence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes. It existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards it as a separate entity, and the law of property considers it in being for all purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or dissent… All writers who discuss the problem have joined in condemning the old rule, and maintaining that the unborn child out of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother. [4]

In reference to property law, in 1941, a New York Court stated: “it has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts in respect of the state matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child en ventre sa mère (in its mother’s womb) is ‘born’ and ‘alive’ for all purposes for his benefit.”[5]

The rules of property law have not changed, and pre-born children are still afforded their just legal protections. If property law recognizes the rights of a child in its mother’s womb, it makes no sense that the court would deny them, especially since property was not the only area of law in which those rights were recognized.

By 1971, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia allowed suits for prenatal injuries based on tort law, and an additional nine rejected the viability distinction and allowing recovery[6]. In 1953, a New York State appellate court found that:

We ought to be safe in this respect. In saying that legal separability should begin where there is biological separability. We know something more of the actual process of conception and foetal development now than when some of the common-law cases were decided; and what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception.[7]

This rationale was also stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1960:

As for the notion that the child must have been viable when the injuries were received, which is claimed the attention of several of the states, we regard it as having little to do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is regarded as having existence as a separate creature from the moment of conception.[8]

Today, only three states do not provide tort claims for prenatal injuries, nearly 3 thirty states allow for recovery at any point in the pregnancy[9]. This is yet another example of the schizophrenic nature of the Supreme Court denying pre-born children recognition under the law, when the law of torts clearly recognized their rights.

In criminal law, the quickening distinction was dropped my most a legislatures by the 1860s as medical science progressed, and today thirty-eight states have abolished the born alive rule in the lower prosecution for fetal homicide at any time in the pregnancy.[10]him him

Justice Blackmun, writing for the court in Roe, stated that the court did not need to decide the “difficult” question of when life begins, but this is the most important question to be decided. Because it is not the courts job to decide what philosophy or religion is correct, it must be scientific fact which dictates who is covered by the Constitution.  There is no doubt that human life begins at conception (also called fertilization), and even the most cursory glance into the science of fetal development would confirm this fact.[11] The court gave no rationalization for why a human and a person were separate entities, that required separate legal protections under the law, and many have criticized this distinction as similar to the one the Court made in Dred v Scott.[12]

[1] Roe

[2] Roger Resler, Compelling Interest, page 19 – 30

[3] Compelling Interest, page 26

[4] Prof. William Prosser Law of Torts at 335.

[5] In re Holtenhausen’s Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d  140 (NY Surr. Ct. 1941).

[6] Abuse of Discretion , page 275

[7] Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App.Div. 542, 125 NYS.2d 696, 697 (1953).

[8]Sinkler v Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960)

[9] Abuse  of Discretion, page 283 figure 7.

[10] Abuse of Discretion, page 284-5  figure 9.

[11] See e.g. (a compilation of quotes from recognized medical textbooks and authorities,  on when human life begins)

[12] See e.g Compelling Interest, page 20;  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey at 998

The Viability of Roe, Part 2: From Roe to Carhart


While Roe did not expressly declare abortion to be a “fundamental right,” in the wake of the decision many lower federal courts certainly interpreted abortion as such.[1] Indeed, many of the abortion cases that the Court heard between Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey dealt with overturning this presumption by the lower courts. A brief overview of some of the major pre-Casey abortion cases will be beneficial in illustrating how the Court got from Roe to Casey:

  • Connecticut v. Menillo (1975) – In a per curium decision, the Court upheld Connecticut’s criminal prohibition against non-physicians performing abortions, stating that “Roe did not go that far.”[2]
  • Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976) – The Court upheld part of a state statute requiring a woman to give written consent prior to undergoing an abortion, but struck down spousal and parental consent requirements.[3]
  • Bellotti v. Baird (1976) – The Court this time upheld the requirement that a minor seeking an abortion must obtain parental consent, provided that there is the option for a “judicial bypass” whereby the minor can obtain consent from a judge if necessary.[4]
  • Harris v. McRae (1980) – The Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which forbade federal funding of abortions. The Court reasoned in this case that abortion was not a fundamental right.[5]
  • City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. (1983) – The Court struck down a 24 hour waiting period between the time a woman seeking an abortion received counseling, and when she could undergo the abortion procedure.[6]
  • Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986) – The Court struck down a number of state regulations, including informed consent requirements, reporting requirements for abortion clinics, and regulations on the medical aspects of the abortion procedure.[7] Though the majority referred to “a woman’s right to make that choice [abortion] freely [as] fundamental,” they did not apply strict scrutiny in their rationale.[8]
  • Rust v. Sullivan (1991) – The Court upheld federal finding regulations that restricted federal funding from be awarded to family planning clinics that counseled for, or performed abortions. The Court relied on Harris in its decision.[9]

As demonstrated by these sometimes contradictory rulings, the Court seemed unsure of how to apply its own rule from Roe. For example, while Thornburg called abortion a “fundamental right,” the Court chose not to apply a strict scrutiny standard of review in the case.[10] Likewise in Bellotti and Harris, the Court referred only to an “undue burden” or “unduly burdensome” analysis.[11]

A. Planned Parenthood v. Casey

The confusion over abortion law, as seen in the decisions listed above, intensified the national debate over the issue. In 1992, many believed that the Court was poised to overturn Roe, but instead, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Court decided to take a much narrower approach to redefining abortion jurisprudence.[12]

In taking a narrow approach, the three judge plurality purported to rely on the concept of stare decisis to reaffirm the central holding of Roe of “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability.”[13] In defense of this affirmation the plurality claimed Roe had “call[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”[14] Furthering this argument, the plurality argued that overturning Roe would “seriously weaken the Court‘s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.”[15] The plurality also relied on their belief that:

[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.  The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.[16]


In response to these claims, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist pulled no punches in their respective dissents. Answering the plurality’s argument that overturning Roe would weaken the Court, Justice Scalia had the following to say:

In my history book, the Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford, an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not abandon, rather than by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which produced the famous “switch in time” from the Court’s erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional opposition to the social measures of the New Deal.[17]



Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent responded to the plurality’s claim regarding women’s social and economic equality with similar skepticism:

The joint opinion’s assertion of this fact is undeveloped and totally conclusory. In fact, one cannot be sure to what economic and social developments the opinion is referring.  Surely it is dubious to suggest that women have reached their ‘places in society’ in reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of their determination to obtain higher education and compete with men in the job market, and of society’s increasing recognition of their ability to fill positions that were previously thought to be reserved only for men… The “separate but equal” doctrine lasted 58 years after Plessy, and Lochner’s protection of contractual freedom lasted 32 years. However, the simple fact that a generation or more had grown used to these major decisions did not prevent the Court from correcting its errors in those cases, nor should it prevent us from correctly interpreting the Constitution here.[18]


Despite these harsh criticisms from their fellow justices, the plurality still chose to interpret stare decisis in a way that prevented them from overturning Roe. However, while the plurality claimed to be reaffirming the central holding of Roe they made significant changes to the Court’s existing abortion doctrine.

One of the biggest changes Casey made was expressly abandoning abortion as a fundamental privacy right, and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard of review. This shift from privacy to liberty is evidenced in what is sometimes mockingly referred to as Casey’s “Mystery of Life Passage”: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”[19]

In place of the previous standard, the plurality described abortion as a “protected liberty interest” that was measured according to an intermediate level standard of review called “undue burden.”[20] The plurality defined “undue burden” as a regulation that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.”[21]

But what exactly is “undue”? Under this standard, the Casey Court upheld informed consent, a 24 hour waiting period, reporting requirements for abortion facilities, parental consent (with judicial bypass), and a definition of “medical emergency” related to abortion; the only Casey requirement struck down was spousal consent.[22] But it is only contextually through cases that we can truly determine which burdens the Court believes are “undue’, as the guideline is difficult to interpret in a vacuum.

Justice Scalia has long been a critic of the “undue burden” standard, arguing that it places the Court in the inappropriate position of making legislative decisions regarding abortion legislation that are not guided by the Constitution, but rather are guided by the personal opinions and feelings of the individual Justices.[23]

Another major change the plurality made to Roe was to abandon the trimester framework set down in Roe, and focus solely on viability as the “compelling point.” In their reasoning, the plurality claimed that “there is no line other than viability which is more workable” as a compelling point for state’s interest to take hold.[24] The plurality also justified viability by arguing that there is an “element of fairness” in choosing it, because “in some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing child.”[25] At this time the Court also recognized that medical technology had advanced to the point that viability was now generally accepted to be at approximately 21 weeks post-fertilization.[26] Finally, the plurality says that “the trimester framework… [did] not fulfill Roe’s own promise that the State has an interest in protecting fetal life or potential life.[27] Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, spends a considerable amount of time and space explaining the importance of the State’s “profound interest in potential human life.”[28] This is an argument Justice Kennedy would continue to defend eloquently in abortion subsequent cases.

In the opinion of the dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, the state’s interest in protecting fetal life is profound enough to require that Roe be overturned in its entirety, so that states were free to ban abortion as they saw fit.[29]

B. Stenberg v. Carhart

The next major legal challenge to abortion came in 2000, when late term abortionist Leroy Carhart challenged Nebraska’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.[30] Nebraska’s ban sought to outlaw a specific method of abortion, which is described in gruesome detail in Justice Kennedy’s dissent:

[T]he abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes over a sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the procedure report seeing the body of the fetus moving outside the woman’s body. At this point, the abortion procedure has the appearance of a live birth. As stated by one group of physicians, “as the physician manually performs breech extraction of the body of a live fetus, excepting the head, she continues in the apparent role of an obstetrician delivering a child.” With only the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate instrument to be used at this stage of the abortion is a pair of scissors. Witnesses report observing the portion of the fetus outside the woman, react to the skull penetration. The abortionist then inserts a suction tube and vacuums out the developing brain and other matter found within the skull. The process of making the size of the fetus’ head smaller is given the clinically neutral term “reduction procedure.” Brain death does not occur until after the skull invasion, and, according to Dr. Carhart, the heart of the fetus may continue to beat for minutes after the contents of the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next completes the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to the head and the missing contents of the skull.[31]


Despite these grisly facts, the Court voted 5-4 that Nebraska’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban was unconstitutionally vague because it did not adequately differentiate Partial-Birth Abortion from method, as well as finding that it violated the “undue burden” standard because it lacked a Roe style health exception.[32]

As the author of Casey, which he thought to be a grand compromise that would end the abortion debate once and for all, Justice Kennedy was furious and this can be seen in his scathing dissent. Justice Kennedy claims the majority in Stenberg has “a basic misunderstanding of Casey,”[33] and “contradict[ed] Casey’s premise that States have a vital constitutional position in the abortion debate.”[34] Additionally, Justice Kennedy accused the majority of “fail[ing] to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State to take sides in a medical debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake.”[35] To bolster this claim, Justice Kennedy cites the Court’s prior decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, where a man was convicted for refusing to receive the small pox vaccine.[36] In Hendricks, the Court ruled that disagreements among medical professionals “do not tie the State’s hands in setting the bounds of…laws. In fact, it is precisely where such a disagreement exists that the legislatures have been afforded the greatest latitude.”[37]

Justice Kennedy went on to argue that the Court was ignoring “substantial medical and ethical opinion[s]”[38] regarding this procedure, “which, in the State’s reasonable determination, might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus.”[39]

Justice Scalia also wrote a scathing dissent in Stenberg, in which he expressed his hope that “one day, Stenberg will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court’s jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.”[40]

C. Gonzales v. Carhart

Fortunately for Justice Scalia, he did not have to wait very long. In response to Stenberg, Congress held fact finding hearings on Partial-Birth Abortion, and eventually passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003.[41] The factual findings Congress used to support this Act included, among others, that:

  • A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion…is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.
  • [Partial-Birth Abortion is] unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, [and] in fact poses serious risks to the long-term health of women and in some circumstances, their lives.
  • A prominent medical association has concluded that partial-birth abortion is ‘not an accepted medical practice’…The association has further noted that partial-birth abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical experts and the public, is ‘ethically wrong,’ and ‘is never the only appropriate procedure’.
  • It is a medical fact…that unborn infants at this stage can feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their perception of this pain is even more intense than that of newborn infants and older children when subjected to the same stimuli. Thus, during a partial-birth abortion procedure, the child will fully experience the pain associated with piercing his or her skull and sucking out his or her brain.
  • In light of this overwhelming evidence, Congress and the States have a compelling interest in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. In addition to promoting maternal health, such a prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that preserves the integrity of the medical profession, and promotes respect for human life.[42]


Congress, hoping to avoid the impermissibly broad reading the Court used to strike down Nebraska’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, carefully crafted the descriptive language of the procedure. However, as seen in the Congressional findings listed above, Congress adamantly stuck by their belief that Partial-Birth Abortion was never medically necessary, and as such, did not include any language regarding a health exception to the ban.

Before it could even be signed into law by President George W. Bush, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 was challenged by abortionist Leroy Carhart, who had previously been the victor in Stenberg The resulting case, Gonzales v. Carhart, Court concluded that the legitimacy of the government’s interests in banning partial-birth abortions disproved the notion that the ban had the impermissible purpose of placing a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”[43]

Justice Kennedy once again wielded his pen in defense of State’s interests, composing the majority opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the “central premise of [Casey]” was “that the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life.”[44] In seeking to balance “the State’s interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy,”[45] and a woman’s right to choose abortion, the Court ruled that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban advanced a legitimate legislative purpose by “express[ing] respect for the dignity of human life,”[46] by promoting the state’s interest in “protecting the ethics and integrity of the medical profession,” and by preventing the “further coarsen[ing] [of] society to the humanity of…all vulnerable and innocent human life.”[47]

In finding that the Act’s lack of a health exception did not impose an “undue burden,” the Court considered the medical findings Congress relied upon to justify the Act.[48] This gave Justice Kennedy the chance to reiterate his arguments from his previous dissent in Stenberg, now held by the majority in Gonzales, regarding the right of a state to take sides in medical debates, ruling once and for that, “[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”[49]

The dissent in Gonzales harshly criticized the majority decision as, “blur[ring] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between pre-viability and post-viability abortions.”[50]  Outside critics of the Court’s decision have gone even further, claiming that the fact that the ban applied both pre- and post-viability constituted “a direct violation of Roe’s bright line rule,” and that the Court’s decision to uphold it “demonstrated that the fixed point of viability can be bypassed.”[51]

[1] See e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975); Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1148 (7th Cir. 1974); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974).

[2] Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975).

[3] Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

[4] Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).

[5] Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

[6] City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).

[7]Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

[8] Id., at 772.

[9] Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

[10] Thornburg, 476 U.S. at 772.

[11] Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640; Harris, 448 U.S. at 235.

[12] Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

[13] Id., at 846.

[14] Id., at 867.

[15] Id., at 865.

[16] Id., at 856.

[17] Id., at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

[18] Id., at 956-7 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).

[19] Id., at 851.

[20] Id., at 877.

[21] Id.

[22] See generally, Id.

[23] Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks to Baton Rouge Federalist Society (October 11, 2013).

[24] Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.

[25] Id.

[26] Id., at 860 (23 weeks LMP).

[27] Id., at 876.

[28] Id.

[29] Id., at 944.

[30] Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

[31] Id., at 959-60.

[32] Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914.

[33] Id., at 964.

[34] Id., at 963.

[35] Id., at 970.

[36] Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).

[37] Id., at 360.

[38] Stenberg, 530 U.S at 797.

[39] Id., at 961.

[40] Id., at 953; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Upholding the constitutionality of the military imprisonment of thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent , in internment camps during World War II); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)(Holding  that an African American slave is not a “person” under the U.S. Constitution; and was therefore the property of the slave owner).

[41] Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004).

[42] See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (note following) (congressional findings for Pub. L. No. 108-105, §2, Nov. 5, 2003, 117 Stat. 1201).

[43] Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160.

[44] Id., at 157.

[45] Id., at 163 (emphasis added).

[46] Id., at 157.

[47] Id.

[48] Id., at 165.

[49] Id., at 164.

[50] Id. at 186.

[51] Katia Desrouleaux, Banning Partial-Birth Abortion at All CostsGonzales v. Carhart: Three Decades of Supreme Court Precedent “Down the Drain”, 35 S.U. L. Rev. 543, 553 (2008); Jason Pill, Constitutional Law: Drawing A New Critical Line Between the State’s Competing Interests in Abortion Regulation to Comport with Social Palpability Gonazales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), 19 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 369, 378 (2008).